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Race, Redlining, and Automobile
Insurance Prices*

I. Intntduction
In recetit years, substantial attetilion and controversy has focused on tests for racial discrimination in markets for financial services, especially
in residential mortgage lending (e.g.. Berkovec et
al. 1994: Holmes and Horviiz 1994; Ferguson
and Peters 1995; Munnel et al. 1996; Harrison
1998).' Insurance companies also are often alleged to engage in racial discrimination in the
fonn of "redlining" that raises prices and restricts availability of coverage, and these allegations have received considerable public-policy attention.- Despite this controversy, little is known
about the extent to which premiums are higher

* We ihank the National Association of Independent Insurers for purchasing Iht* data. :in anonytnoiis reviewer. Doug Dianmnd. Anil Sliivilasani. :inU workshop participants al Ihe University of Michigan, the tJniversity of South Carolina, and the
1996 meetings of the American Risk and Insurance Association
and the Risk Theory Society lor helpful comments.
1. Als() see the compendiuim <»f essays edited by Yezcr.
Lit>d.sey. and Isaac (1995) and by Stcgman and Goering
(1996). Much of the early empirical litcraiure on discrimination focuses on labor markciii (e.g., Ashenfeiter and Rees
1973).
2. See. e.g.. Squires. DeWoIfc. and DeWolfe (1979) atid
Squires. Velez. and Taeubcr i 1991). Klein (1995) provides a
brief survey of the literature. Congress held extensive hearings
regarding iilleged insurance rodlinin(: in 1993 (Insurame Redlining Pruiiiics 1993). and a nutiiber of slate insurance departments have studied the issue and fed pressure to adopi regula(e.g.. Harrington and Niehaus 1992).
{Journal of Business. 1998, vol. 71. no. 3)
© 1998 by The University of Chicago. AH rights reserved.
0021 -9398/98/7103-O005$O2.5O
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Following Becker's
(1993) suggestion that
tests for discriminiUion
shtiuld altempl to inftrr
whether protits differ
for products si)ld to minorities and nonminorities. this article tests
the hypothesis that racial discrimination affects market prices of
auto insurance in Missouri. Compared with
tests for discrimination
in lending miykcts. our
results are less susceptible to bias from omitted variables. Controlling for available
detnographic and coverage-related factors,
we do not find ihal
loss ratios at the zipcode level are negalively related to percent tiiinority population. This finding is
inconsistent with the
hypothesis that racial
discrimination increases premiums relative to expected claim
costs for minorities.
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in areas with large tninority populations relative to the costs of providing coverage in these areas.^
Racial discrimination that had a substantive effect on the supply of
insurance would itnply unexploited prolitable investment opportunities
and thus would require pervasive prejudice and significant eniry harriers for potential nonprejudiced entrants. The existence of large numbers
of insurers that art licensed to write auto insurance in most states with
relatively low market concentration and entry costs (e.g., Klein 1989;
Cummins and Tennyson 1992) militates against substantive economic
effects from racial discrimination. The altetTiative hypothesis is that
racial prejudice is pervasive enough in conjunction with entry costs or
other market imperfections to allow di.scrimlnatory practices to hiirm
minorities significantly.
Following Becker's (1993) suggestion that tests for discrimination
should attempt to infer whether profits differ for product.s or services
sold to minorities and nonminorities. this article tests the hypothesis
that widespread racial discrimination affects the pricing of auto insurance at the market level. We first present a framework for analyzing
discrimination in pricing or risk selection. The key testable implication
is that if insurers discriminate, either by charging higher markups in
areas with high minority populations or. more opaquely, by applying
more restrictive underwriting standards to minorities, then the ratio of
expected claim costs to premiums (the expected-loss ratio) will be
lower, ceteris paribus. in areas with a higher percentage of minorities,
consistent with higher expected profit margins in these areas. We test
the prediction that discrimination implies lower loss ratios (ratios of
average claim costs to average premiums) for minorities using insurance market and demographic data by zip code from Missouri, one of
the few states that has collected premiums and claim cost information
by zip code."* Missouri's population exhibits diversity in terms of race
and other demographic characteristics. Because its automobile-insurance market essentially is free of prior approval rate and underwriting
regulation, the data can be viewed as the result of market conduct rather
than regulation.
Tests of discrimination in mortgage lending using data on default
rates and rejection rates have been controversial, in large part because
of the possibility of omitted variables related to differences in credit
3. Klein (1995) finds that homeowners itisurancc average prtftiiiums for zip awJes in
33 metropolitan statislieal areas in 20 states are positively related to percent tninority population artcr controlling fur a variety of demographic variables. His models include a variable
measuring averdge claim costs by rating territory, but this variable does not control for
possible ditferences in claim cmts across zip codes within a Icrritory thai could be correlaied with percent minority population.
4, The loss ratio is a commonly used measure of (inversej price or {^ofitability in insurance markeu.
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risk for minorities and nonminorities (e.g.. Berkovecet al. 1994; Ferguson and Peters 1995; Shaffer 1996; Stegman and Goering 1996). The
possibility of omitled-variable bias would be reduced significantly if
mortgage-lend ing studies could examine a loan profitability measure
that compared expected default losses with lending rales because any
omitted variable affecting credit risk would influence expected default
losses and lending rates in the same direction if lending rates vary with
credit risk. Since measures of insurance profitability (loss ratios) are
available and premiums vary wilh expected claim cosls. our predictions
and tests for discrimination should be affected substantially less, if at
all. by omitted variables related to possible differences in claim-cost
distributions between minorities and nonminorities.
Controlling for a variety of demographic and insurance coverage
variables that might affect loss ratios al the zip-code level, our key
finding Is that loss ratios are not significantly lower in zip codes with
larger minority populations. Thus, our loss-ratio analysis is inconsistent
with the argument ihat widespread racial discrimination increases the
price of automobile insurance in Missouri. An immediate implication
is that comparatively high aulo-insurance premiums in urban areas with
larger minority populations are attributable to high claim costs in these
areas—not to discrimination. Consistent with this implication, univariate comparisons indicate a strong, positive relation between average
claim costs and percent minority population by zip ctxle in Missouri,
We also provide evidence that average claim costs remain positively
related lo percent minority pt>pu!ation after controlling for a variety
of demographic and insurance-coverage variables that could influence
costs, which suggests that percent minority population is correlated
with omitted variables that increase cosls.
We also provide evidence of the relation between percent minority
population and the market share of so-called nonstandard insurers.
which specialize in insuring applicants who do not qualify for coverage
wilh insurers that specialize in providing coverage at lower premium
rates to "standard" or "preferred" risks. Thus, nonstandard insurers
are more likely to insure drivers with high expected claim costs and
drivers wilh a greater likeiih(x)d of nonpayment of premiums or nonrenewal, which increases the premium needed to recover up-fronl underwriting costs over ihe expected duration of the contractual relationship.
While our theoretical framework implies that discrimination via more
restrictive underwriting will cause the market share of nonstandard insurers lo be higher in areas with a higher percentage of minorities after
controlling for all relevant cost and demand factors, empirical analysis of nonstandard market share, like analyses of mortgage rejection
rates, is highly susceptible to omitted-variable bias. Indeed, because
our average claim-cost results imply that percent minority population is
correlated with omitted variables that increase claim costs, these results
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predict a positive relation between the market share of nonstandard
(higher-cost/higher-premium) insurers without discrimination after
controlling for our demographic and coverage variables, which is exactly what we find. Moreover, our loss-ratio findings, which are inconsistent with discrimination, imply that a positive relation between nonstandard market share and percent minority population would reflect
omitted variables. Thus, although our analysis of nonstandard market
share by itself cannot distinguish whether a positive relationship between nonstandard share and percent minority population reflects discrimination or omitted variables, our loss-ratio and average claim-cost
results strongly support the omitted-variable explanation.
A limitation of our analysis is thai the insurance market data are
aggregated at the zip-code level and are not available separately for
minority and nonminority drivers. We also do not have data at the zipcode level on nonloss costs associated with the production of insurance,
including costs that could be related to differences in quality. As a
result, we rely on reduced form equations that include percent minority
population and other demographic variables for the total population
rather than the insured population. While we can test for a relationship
between loss ratios and percent minority population, we cannot directly
test or control for possible racial discrimination through lower quality
that might cause profits to vary by race even if loss ratios do not. Our
finding that loss ratios are not negatively related to percent minority
population, which is Inconsistent with racial discrimination in pricing
holding quality fixed, is nonetheless important in view of the policy
debate and dearth of empirical analysis in this area.
The next section develops the main hypotheses and the methodology
for our empirical tests. The data and variables analyzed are described
in Section IH. Results for the loss-ratio models are presented in Section
IV. Our analysis of the relationship between percent minority population, average claim costs, and nonstandard market share is presented
in Section V. Our conclusions are summarized in the last section.
II. Hypotheses and Empirical Framework
A. Risk Selection, Loss Ratios, and Nonstandard Market Share
Auto insurers file with state regulators premium rates for a large number of "driver classes" and "territories." About half the states {but
not Missouri) subject these rates to prior regulatory approval. In Missouri and most other states, rating plans (driver classes, territories, and
associated rates) can vary across insurers. Since racial discrimination
is illegal, rating plans cannot depend overtly on race, and a maintained
assumption throughout our analysis is that race is not an underlying
determinant of expected costs.
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If persistent discrimination at the market level is feasible, there are
two main ways that racial discrimination could influence prices charged
insurance buyers.'^ First, insurers could file rates ihat exhibit a greater
markup over expected costs for rating territories wilh a higher proportion of minorities, thus causing loss ratios lo be negatively related lo
percent minority population. Second, insurers could discriminate by
applying more stringent underwriting standards lo insure minorities
than nonminorities. Such discrimination through risk selection would
likely be more opaque than increasing markups in areas with large minority populations.
Insurers can decline coverage to applicants in Missouri and most
other states. They use information other than driver characteristics included in their filed rating plan to establish criteria for accepting or
rejecting applicants. The acceptance criteria ("underwriting standards"), often are proprietary and can vary across insurers, including
across aftitiated insurers under common ownership. Stricter underwriting standards are associated with lower rates. If insurers apply stricter
underwriting standards to minorities, then minorities would be rejected
more often ihan is justified by unbiased forecasts of expecied costs.
As a consequence, minorities would be pushed lo insurers with higher
rates {and less stringent standards) and therefore have (o pay a higher
markup over unbiased expected costs, thus compensating these insurers
for their aversion to serving minorities. This form of discrimination
would cause loss ratios in both the overall market and the nonstandard
market lo be lower in areas with large minority populations, and it
would increase nonstandard market share.
B. Model of Discrimination through Risk Selection
We present a simple model of racial discrimination through risk selection that yields predictions about the relationship between race, loss
ratios, and market shares of insurers that specialize in terms of underwriting criteria. Although insurer specialization and nonstandard insurers are commonly discussed in the professional literature, there has
been little formal analysis of insurer specialization wilh respect lo underwriting criteria.** The model also helps explain why differences in
5. Evidence on price variation in relation to expected claim costs in insurance markets
is not readily reconciled with iiKKJcIsolnilioning (e.g.. Stigliu and Weiss 1981: Ferguson
and Peters 1997), Given mir datii ;ind fiicus. we also abstracl from issues of asymmetric
inlurmalion and associated consumer ,'iorting a la Rothschild ami SliglJty (1976). D'Arcy
and Doherty (1990) and Dionne and Dtiherly (1994) develop models in which "low-bair"
or "high-ball" pricing by insurer, in response lo asymmetric intormation could cause
variation in loss ratios acniss insurers and over time in conjunction with differences in
insurer growth rales. As noted below, we control for exposure growth in some of our tesLs.
6. Smallwood (1975) considers a nicxiei in which dircct-writing insurers apply more
selective underwriting standards than insurers that use independent agents. Our model is
analogous tu mtxJels of the effeci of discriminulion in mortgage lending on default rates
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(he distributions of expected claim costs between racial groups are
much less likely to bias the analysis of insurance loss ratios than the
analysis of nonstandard market shares.
Assume for simplicity Ihat each insurer uses the same factors in its
filed risk-classification system with A' distinct risk (driver type and geographic territory) classes. 7 = 1, 2. . . . . A^. The premium charged by
insurer k to all drivers in risk class j equals P]. An insurer's premiums
will differ across risk classes in relation 10 expected claim costs (e.g,.
young males will be charged higher premiums). The focus of this analysis, however, is on how premiums for a given risk class will differ
across insurers in relation to their underwriting criteria (e.g.. State Fann
or Allstate may charge lower premiums to young males than a nonstandard insurer). .Since the conceptual analysis focuses on one risk class,
further reference to class j is omitted with the understanding that subsequently defined variables can vary across risk clas.ses.
Each consumer has a set of characteristics that place him or her in
a particular risk class, as well as a characteristic that is observable to
insurers, denoted Z. that influences expected claim costs, but which is
not pan of the risk-cla.ssification system. Without loss of generality,
we define Z in terms of dollars of additional expected claim costs above
the base expected claim cost for the risk class, which is denoted -4.
Thus, a consumer is assumed to have expected claim cost conditional
on infonnation that can be obtained at sufficiently low cost equal to
C = A + Z, where A is constant for all consumers in the risk class
and Z varies across individuals within the risk class.
Underwriting for insurer k is implemented by setting a maximum
value for Z such ihat il accepts black applicants if their Z is less than
Mi and accepts white applicants if their Z is less than Ml. If A/J, is less
than Ml. then insurer k requires, at the margin, a lower expected claim
cost to insure blacks than whites (stricter standards are applied to
blacks). The average expected claim cost for blacks and whites wbo
are offered coverage by firm k is
Et = E(C\Z < Aft) = A + E(Z\Z < Aff)
and
Ei = EiC\Z < A/1) = A + E(Z\Z < Af*),
where the expectation is with respect to the distributions of Z for black
and white applicants for firm A.
If the distribution of Z for applicants that apply to firm k is tbe same
for whites and blacks and if A/J is less than Afi (stricter standards are
applied to blacks), tben the average expected claim cost for blacks of(e.g.. BerkDvec ct al, 1994). except that these m<xic!s invariably assume a uniform lending
rale regardless of applicant crcUil risk.
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fered coverage is less than that for whites. In addition, given that the
premium charged by insurer k, P \ is the same for all consumers (black
and white) in a risk class, the average expected loss ratio for blacks
offered coverage in a risk class is less than the average expected loss
ratio for whites: E{LRl) = E'lJP' < E{LRl) = E\JP'.
If the distribution of Z for applicants that apply for coverage with
company k is not the same for blacks and whites, it is possible that the
average expected claim cost and loss ratio for blacks could exceed that
for whites even if stricter standards are applied to blacks. This could
occur, for example, if there are relatively fewer blacks with low values
of Z insured by company k. That is. although a lower value of Z is
required for blacks, the average expected cost is nonetheless higher for
blacks because there are relatively few low Z blacks compared with
whites.' A related result has been emphasized in analyses of mortgage
lending that consider whether racial discrimination implies lower loan
default rates for minorities than for nonminorities (e.g.. Berkovec et
al. 1994; Ferguson and Peters 1995).'* However, tbis possibility has
less relevance to the analysis of loss ratios in insurance markets where
insurers vary premiums according to expected claim costs and underwriting standards.
To elaborate, if insurance companies specialize according to the
maximum values of Z that they will insure and set premium rates accordingly, then companies with stricter underwriting standards (lower
maximums for Z) will attract inframarginal applicants from companies
with looser underwriting standards. This process reduces the variation
in Z for a given insurer. With costless search and free entry, in equilibriutn, consumers will each buy coverage from an insurer that has a
maximum value of Z equal to the consumer's value of Z. and there
will be no inframarginal consumers. The expected claim costs for black
and white poHcyholders with company k will be related as follows:
Ei = E{C\Z = Af J) < Ei = E{C\Z = Ml).
Since the price charged by insurer k is the same for blacks and whites,
the expected loss ratio for blacks insured. £j,/P*, is unambiguously less
than that for whites insured. ElJP\ if stricter standards are applied to
blacks {Ml < Ml). Given similar behavior across risk classes, aggregate expected loss ratios are lower for blacks than for whites insured
7. This outcome leads to a somewhat perverse notion of discrimination. Specifically,
if differences in ihc distribution of Z caused blacks to have higher average expected claim
costs and loss ralios than whiles despite Mi < Ml, average expected prolits will be lower
on policies sold to whites than blacks, in contrast to the standard for economic discrimination enunciated by Becker < 1993).
8. Peterson (1981) paivides an early treatment of this issue in (he contexi of possible
sex discrimination in mortgage lending. Also see the collection of essays on the Berkovec
et al. .study (Scegman and Goering 1996) and many of the essays in Yezer et al. (1995).
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by each company, and market loss ratios are lower for blacks than
whites.
Costly search and incomplete sortitig of consumers according to the
maximum values of Z used by different insurers would lead to some
heterogeneity in expected claim costs among insureds of the same race
in a given class for a given insurer. Nevertheless, the analysis of insurer
specialization with respect to underwriting criteria implies that the
greater the degree of specialization, the less likely that any difference
in the distribution of Z between whites and blacks could lead to higher
loss ratios for blacks despite a higher underwriting standard for blacks,
thus reducing the likelihood that loss ratio comparisons will be bixsed
against finding evidence of discrimination (lower toss ratios).'
Nonstandard insurers can be viewed within this framework as having
looser underwriling standards (higher cutoffs for Z). If the distribution
of drivers across risk classes and the distribution of Z within a risk
class are the same for blacks and whites, then tighter underwriting standards for blacks (discrimination) itnply a higher nonstandard market
share for blacks. But nonstandard market share could be higher for
blacks without discrimination if relatively more black drivers than
white drivers were in higher risk classes or if relatively more blacks
than whites had high values of Z. Thus, inability to control for all the
factors affecting risk classes or Z could give rise lo a positive relation
between nonstatidard share and race. We return lo this issue below.
C. Testing for Discrimination Using Loss Ratios
The theoretical fratiiework predicts that racial discrimination will cause
loss ratios to be lower for blacks than for whites, holding non-claimcosts constant. To motivate our tests of this hypothesis with available
data, we now describe a simple model of aggregate voluntary insurance
market pricing at the zip-code level.'" Underwriting automobile insurance involves three types of costs: claim costs, transaction costs (administrative, marketing, and claim-processing costs), and the cost of
investing capital to bond insurer promises to pay claims. Let EXPCC,
equal the average (per exposure) of expected claim costs for zip-code
/, and let X, equal the proportional loading factor ihat reflects the average non-claim costs for zip-code / and incorporates a present
value factor. Then the average premium per exposure in zip-code /
(AVGPREM,) can be written:
AVGPREM, - n,X,
9. Also, the greater Ihe degree of insurer specialization, (he lower the likelihtxxl thai
low-expected-loss consumers in a given risk class will select out and nol purchase in.surance.
10. The same framework applie.s lo los.-; ratios for the nonstandard market at the zipcode level.
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where \x, is the average markup factor relative to expected average
costs." Racial discrimination In risk selection or by using a higher
markup in areas with larger minority populations implies that |i, will
be higher in areas with larger minority populations, thus producing
higher premiums for a given value of EXPCC,.
Average premiums also will clearly be higher in areas with larger
minority populations without discrimination if expected claim costs are
higher. In a similar manner, nonstandard market share will be higher in
these areas without discrimination given that the factors causing higher
expected claim costs will also Increase nonstandard market share. Thus,
inability lo control for all factors that increase claim costs and that are
correlated with percent minority population would cause both average
claim costs and nonstandard market share to be positively related to
percent minority population without discrimination.
Given the preceding expressioti for AVGPREM,, the expected loss
ratio equals
EXPCCyAVGPREM, =

(HA.)"'-

While the expected loss ratio is inversely related to both \x, and X,,
there is less reason to expect that il will depend on expected claim costs
and thus on unobservable factors that could cause expected claim costs
to differ between races. As a result, the analysis of ioss ratios will be
much less susceptible to bias from the omission of variables that are
correlated with claim costs and race.'Expected claim costs and thus expected loss ratios are not observable. Let AVGCC, equal realized average claitii costs and assume
that Iog(AVGCC,) equals log(EXPCC,) plus a mean-zero random
disturbance, e,. Taking the log of AVGPREM,, substituting for
Iog(EXPCC,), and rearranging lenns gives
log(LOSSRAT,) = where LOSSRAT, - AVGCC,/AVGPRHM,.'' As discussed above, racial discrimination in risk selection or by using a higher markup in
areas with larger minority populations implies that (i, will be higher
11. The distinct parameters for nonctaim costs (X,) and the average markup f|a,l would
not he idcntiliahle using data on average premiums and average claim costs without a
model of how these parameters vary with other factors. We introduce such a model below.
12. If there are fixed costs in selling policies and the effects ot discounting anil all other
nonclaim costs are strictly proportional to expected claim costs, then the e.xpected loss
ratio will he negatively related to expected claim costs. However, the magnitude of the
resulting hias from omitted variables related lo expected claim costs should nonetheless
be small given that fixed costs are likely to represent a small proportion of premiums. (See
appendix A for further discussion.) Al.so sec n. 26 below.
13. An advantage of using the logof the loss ratio in our analysis and logs in our average
cost equations (discussed below) is that it reduces positive skewness in the disturbances.
The use of tog models for average claim costs is common (e.g.. Butler 1994).
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and thus that expected and realized loss ratios will be lower in these
areas.
Because we do not have data on the racial composition of the insured
population by zip code, we cannot estimate a structural model of loss
ratios, perhaps controlling for self-selection bias that could occur if
buyers that face the lowest expected loss ratios (highest prices) are less
likely to buy coverage. Instead, we estimate the following reduced fomi
regression equation:
log(LOSSRAT,) = /"^•^•^^^PCTBLACK, + piossRATji^^ +

^I.OSSRAT

where PCTBLACK, is the percentage of the total population in zipcode / that is black, X, is a vector of demographic and other factors
that could affect X,. the loading factor that reflects transactions/capital
costs and discounting to present value. The estimate of yLossRAx p^^^^,
sures the sensitivity of I-log(n,) - logO.,)] to PCTBLACK. If X, does
not omit any variable that affects Xi and which is correlated with
PCTBLACK. then a nonnegalive estimate of y-^^^RAi jj. inconsistent
with racial discrimination in pricing. A negative estimate would be consistent with discrimination
The theory of cornpetitive insurance prices (e.g.. Myers and Cohn
1986) suggests that X., will depend on (1) the timing of claim payments,
(2) the risk-adjusted discount rate, (3) the amount of capital held to
bond insurer promises to pay claims (due to tax and agency costs of
capital), and (4) the expense "loading" for insurer underwriting, distribution, claim-settlement, and policy-service costs. With the possible
exception of the risk-adjusted discount rate, these factors could vary
across zip codes due to variation in demand for quality, in market penetration by direct-writing (exclusive agent) insurers with lower distribution costs, in renewal rates on existing contracts, and in the prevalence
of multicar policies and opptirtunitics for cross-selling different types
of coverage to a given policyholder. Data are not available by zip code
to measure any of these factors directly, but variation in these factors
should be related to demographic and coverage related factors that we
can measure, at least approximately. We introduce the specific control
variables in the next section and describe their possible relation to Xi
in the appendix.
If PCTBLACK is positively correlated with an omitted variable that
is negatively related to X, and positively related to the loss ratio, then
the coefficient estimate for PCTBLACK in the loss-ratio equation
would be biased upward and against finding evidence of discrimination.
To argue that profits are higher for blacks than for whites without a
significantly negative coefficient for PCTBLACK would thus require
evidence that non-claim costs (X,) are materially lower for blacks due.
for example, to (1) lower demand for quality by blacks that is not
captured by our control variables or (2) discriminatory reductions in
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certain types of product quality.''* Finally, any correlation between
PCTBLACK and omitted characteristics related to income or wealth
that increase X,. by reducing renewal rates, opportunities for cross-selling, and so on, would bias the coefficient for PCTBLACK downward
and toward finding evidence of discrimination.

m.

Data and Variables

A. The Missouri Data
We analyze Missouri auto-insurance data for the period 1988-92 for
collision, comprehensive (coverage for theft and physical damage other
than collision, such as weather-related claims), and liability coverage
(the data combine property-damage and bodily-injury liability). These
data, which were obtained from the Missouri Department of Insurance,
reflect reported underwriting results of all insurers with more than 500
exposures in Missouri. Since the insurance market data are analyzed
in combination with 1990 census data, we aggregate these data over
time and estimate cross-sectional models.
For each line of business, the data include the number of exposure
units (car years), the number of claims, losses paid (exlusive of claimsettlement expenses), and premiums written by zip code for five policy
(insurer) types (e.g., standard, nonstandard) and five exposure classes
based on car value ranges or liability limits (see the appendix). We
exciude policies issued by the Missouri Joint Underwriting Association
(JUA) because the proportion of consumers that are insured in the JUA
is small in all zip codes and because the state insurance cotnmissioner
regulates JUA rates.'^ We aggregate the voluntary market data (non-

14. Some evidence exists regarding pnxiuci quality differences between minorities and
nonminorities in homeowners' insurance, but it generally relates to quality dimensions thai
are unlikely lo biii.s our iests against finding discrimination, even if it is robust and geneniliziis to auto insurance. For example, Squires el al, (1991) provide evidence that insurers
have fewer marketing outlets (agencies) located in areas with high minority populations.
If associated with lower quality, this difference could reflect higher costs of providing
marketing services in areas with minority populations, which would bias our results toward
finding evidence of discrimination. In ii similar manner. Chan (I997t provides evidence
that complaint.s against homeowners' insurers are greater in areas with high minority populations, which might suggest lower-quality service to minorities. However, if a greater
likelihood of claims fraud and associated efficient insurer responses in the form of greater
expenditures on investigating claims were correlated with percent minority population due
to a relation with unmeasured factors, then expected loss ratios (exclusive of claim settlement costs, as is the case with our data) would be negatively related to percent minority
population absent discrimination. Ihus biasing loss rati<i comparisons toward finding evidence of discrimination.
15. The JUA share of insured exposures for liability coverage in our sample of urban
zip codes ranged from 0%-3.7% with a mean of .1%. The percentages are smaller for
collision and comprehensive coverage.
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JUA policies) across policy types and across exposure classes,'" We
limit the analysis to zip codes with at least 1.000 voluntary market
liability exposure units. Randotn variation in claim costs will likely
be quite large and highly skewed in zip codes with few exposures.
For each zip code and line of business, we calculate the following variables:''
LOSSRAT
AVGPREM
AVGCC
FREQ
SEV
NSSHARE

=
^
=
=
=
=

losses paid per premiums written,
pretniutns written per number of exposure units,
losses paid per number of exposure units,
number of claitns per number of exposure units,
losses paid per number of claims, and
number of nonstandard exposure units per number
of exposute units.

As discussed above, our key test for discrimination is whether LOSSRAT is negatively related to PCTBLACK.
We report results only for the 270 zip codes (in 17 counties) that fall
within Missouri's six metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs): Colutnbia,
Joplin. Kansas City, St. Joseph, St. Louis, and Springfield. Most of the
controversy about race and insurance tnarkets centers on urban areas,
and the MSA criterion eliminates zip codes with generally small numbers of exposures and relatively few minorities. The average number
of exposures and average percentage of the population that is black are
9.097 and 1.5%. respectively, in the 613 nonurban zip codes versus
36,204 and 9.3% in urban zip codes. We also estimated models using
all zip codes with 1,000 or ttiore liability exposures duritig the 5-year
period with little change in the results.

16. The regression analysis includes control variables for the percentage of the market
in dilfereni exposure classes. As discussed below, we also conduct separate analysis for
the nonstandard market and for the voluntary market excluding nonstandard policies, as
well as estimating models of nonstandard market share.
17. The loss data are for claims paid during a given calendar year. Some of these claims
will be for accidents that occurred in prior years. The premium data are for policies sold
in the calendar year, which should retlecl the present value of expected claim costs for
accidents during the coverage period. Depending on the growth rates in exposures and in
average expected claim costs per exposure over time and on ihc interest rate used in discounting, this mismatching of claims and premiums (which should only be material for
liability coverage) could cause the LOSSRAT variable to differ from the expected loss
ratio for policies sold in a given year (see Harrington 1992). If growth rates in insured
exposures or expected costs per exposure differ across zip codes, this mismatch could lead
to a bias in our results if gmwth rates were correlated wiih any of the exogenous variables.
The use of 5-ycar averages should mitigate the inismaich problem, In addition, we included
growth in exposures as an explanatory variable and obtained results similar to those reported in the article.
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Control Variables

The five exposure classes allow us to control for differences in average
insured-vehicle value and liability-coverage limits that will affect expected claitn costs and possibly loss ratios. These variables also will
likely be positively related to differences in wealth and incotue thai
will not be captured by our income measures. For collision and comprehensive coverage, we include log of average car value (log
AVGCARV). For liability coverage, we include the percentage of exposure units in coverage-limit class 2 (MEDLIMITS) and the percentage of exposure units in exposure classes 3, 4. and 5 (HIGHLIMITS).
The omitted category is exposure class I, which includes policies with
the lowest coverage limits.'"
Information on demographic characteristics of the population by zip
code was obtained from 1990 census data.'" The demographic variable
of primary interest is the percentage of the population that is black
(PCTBLACK). We control for a variety of other demographic variables
in the models that reflect: (I) population density. (2) age distribtition
and marital status, and (3) employment, income., and education. The
demographic and coverage variables are summarized in table 1, which
also shows how each variable (other than PCTBLACK} could be related to loss ratios (see the appendix for further discussion). The predicted effect of the variables on loss ratios is usually ambiguous.
We estimated models with and without county dummy variables to
allow for fixed county effects. Including fixed county effects reduces
the possibility of bias from any omitted factors thai have a similar effect
on loss ratios for zip codes within a county, but we have no strong
prior conceming material county effects. Because including fixed
county effects generally produced results with the same implications
for PCTBLACK and led to instability in the coefficients for some control variables, we primarily report results for equations without fixed
effects. Given that the etnployment, income, and education variables generally are highly correlated and correlated with average car
value and HIGHLIMITS, we focus on equations that only include
PCTUNEMP from this category. We also report estimated coeffi-

18. We treat these coverage variables as exogenous. It might be argued that they will
depend on prices and thus loss rutios. These variables also could reflect setf-sclection associated wilh the applicatiiin and approval process, which might create some hia.s of unknown
magnitude and diaxtion (see Rachlis and Yezer 1993). Our judgmenl is that including
these variables is likely Io increase efliciency and power to reject the null hypothesis of
no relation between PCTBLACK and ihe loss ratio. We obtained results with similar implications for PCTBLACK when these variables were omitted.
19. The census files were prepared from U.S. Bureau of the Census data by CIESIN
(Consortium on Intemational F,anh Science Network) with support from the National Aeronautics and Space .Administration. Zip codes change over time and consequently there is
not a pertect match between the census data and insurance data.
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cienls for PCTBLACK for altemative specifications of the loss ratio
model involving PCTPOOR. LMEDHINC, and PCTHIGHS.
C. Descriptive Statistics and CoUinearity Diagnostics
Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics for the insurance market
and control variables for the 270 urban zip codes with complete insurance and demographic data and for two subgroups: (I) all urban zip
codes in which blacks comprise less than 20% of the population (237
zip codes), with an aggregate percentage black population in these zip
codes of 3.6%, and (2) all urban zip codes in whicb blacks comprise
more than 20% of the population (33 zip codes), witb an aggregate
percentage black population of 61.3%. Table 2 indicates that blacks on
average pay higher premiums, bave higher average claim costs, and
higher nonstandard market share in each line of insurance, but loss
ratios are similar for tbe two groups in each line."" Table 3 indicates
that zip codes witb a relatively high proportion of blacks have greater
population density (TOTPOP). poorer economic conditions and education (higher PCTUNEMP and PCTPOOR. lower MEDHINC and
PCTHIGHS), and a much lower percentage of households with married
couples (MARRIED).
Relatively high correlations exist between PCTBLACK, PCTUNEMP, and MARRIED (see tbe appendix).-' CoUinearity diagnostics
described by Belsley (1991) suggest that the estimates on the average
car value and liability coverage variables, MARRIED, and. to a much
lesser extetit, the age variables could be "degraded" by collinearity.
However, otir estimation results for these variables (i.e., frequently
large /-values) often suggest tbat tbis collinearity is not likely to be
harmfuK especially for MARRIED. More important, the diagnostics
provide no indication that tbe estimates for PCTBLACK are likely to
be degraded by collinearity." As is discussed below, we also estimated
20. Comparison of the nonsiandard market data versus the dutii for the toliil voluntmy
market in the 270 urban zip codes (not reported in the tables) indicates that average premiums and average claim costs are approximately 30*?f-9()'yf higher in the nonstandard market with the largest increase for collision and the smallest increase tor comprehensive.
Higher average premiums and claim costs in the nonstandard market are consistent with
this portion of the market reflecting risk categorization and insurer specialization. Although
the nonstandard market has higher average claim costs and premiums, the aggregate loss
ratios for the nonstandard market are smaller than those for the overall market, which
suggests diat nonstandiu-d insurers have higher nonclaim costs.
21. Regressions of PCTBLACK on the remaining explanatory variables in each model
produced Rh of 69%-70^r without fixed effects and 727^-74% with lixcd effects.
22. Specifically, two condition indices and associated variance proportions generally
suggesled '"near" linear dependencies involving the intercept (or county dummies), log
AVGCARV. and MARRIED for collision and comprehensive coverage, and for the Intercept (or county dummies). MARRIF.D. MEDLIMITS. and HIGHLIMITS for liability coverage. The sum of the variance proportions associated with these two condition indices
for PCTBLACK were less than .37. .24. and .12 for collision, comprehensive, and liability,
respectively (compared with Belsley's 11991] suggested cutoff of .5 lo indicate potentially
degraded estimates).
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TABLE 3

4SS
Descriptive Stati'itic's for Insurance Markets aiid Demographic
Variables in 270 Mis,souri Zip Codes

Variable and Statistic
PCTBLACK {%):
Mean
Aggregate
SD
TOTPOP (1.000s):
Mean
Aggregate
SD
PCTt824(%):
Mean
Aggregate
SD
PCT55UP {%):
Mean
Aggregate
SD
MARRIED (%):
Mean
Aggregate
SD
PCTUNEMP (%):
Mean
Aggregate
SD
PCTPOOR (%):
Mean
Aggregaie
SD
MEDHINC($I.(X)O):
Mean
Aggregate
SD
PCTHIGHS (%):
Mean
Aggregate
SD
AVGCARV ($1,000)
collision:
Mean
Aggregaie
SD
AVGCARV ($1,000)
comprehensive;
Mean
Aggregate
SD

270 Urban
Zip Codes

237 Zip
Codes with
PCTBLACK
<20%

33 Zip
Codes with
PCTBLACK
>20%

9.34
14.63
2!.40

2.21
3.56
3.67

60.60
61.31
25.77

12.41
N.A.
12.84

11.43
N.A.
12.69

19.47
N.A.
11.83

12.42
13.57
4.38

12.1S
13.31
4.47

14.42
14.70
3.04

28.84
28.49
7.70

28.72
28.13
7.81

29.67
30.03
6.96

66.91
60.89
16.79

71.04
65.27
1234

37.24
41.68
14.58

5.92
6.12
3.78

5.05
4.83
2.47

12.15
1L57
5.44

11.09
11.09
9.33

8.97
8.19
6.17

26.27
2.3.34
13.46

33.83
N.A.
3.73

34.11
NJi.
3.72

31.82
N.A.
3.21

75.39
77.62
11.16

76.58
79.78
10.35

66.88
68.49
LI. 15

10.97
11.35
1.05

10.93
11.35
1.07

11.29
11.35
.86

10.96
11.08
1.06

10.64
11.08
L08

IL04
IL10
.82
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Variable and Statistic
MEDLIMITS:
Mean
Aggregate
SD
HIGHLIMITS:
Mean
Aggregate
SD

270 Urban
Zip Codes

237 Zip
CixJes wilh
PCTBLACK
<20%

33 Zip
Codes with
PCTBLACK
>20%

28.57
28.82
5.49

28.87
28.85
5.42

26.41
28.55
5.60

37.17
42.37
14.35

38.61
43.99
14.03

26,85
30.65
12.36

CF-.s.—Deinogruphic data are frotn the 1990 U.S. census. The insurance-cover^e data are from
the Missouri Dep;irtment nf Insurance.
NoTB.—PCTBLACK is thi: proportioti of the population that is black. TOTPOP is ihe total population, PCTt824 is the percentage of ihc iidull pi>ptilation between the ages of 18 and 24, PCT55UP is
Ihc percentage of the aJuit populaiion thai is 55 years or older. MARRIED is the percentage of houMSh()!ds with a married couple. PCTUNEMP is the percentage of [he population that is unemployed.
PCTPOOR is the percentage of households with ineome below the poverty level. MEDHtNC is the
median household income. PCTHlGtlS is ihe percentage of Ihe adult [.Hipulatiim that has linished high
schixil. AVCiCARV i.s the average insiu'cd car value based on classifications reported in ihe appendix.
MEDLIMITS i.s iht; percenlage of liability politics with medium limits (e.xposure class 2 in the appendix), anJ HIGHLIMITS is ihe percentile of liability policieii with high limits (exposure ela.sses .1. 4.
and 5 in ihc appendix).

the models excluding some of the regressors as well as including others.
The conclusions with regard to the effects of the variable PCTBLACK
are largely unaltered.
IV. Are Loss Ratios Related to Race?
Table 4 presents weighted least squares regression (WLS) results for
the ioss ratio equation for the overall voluntary market. The weight is
the number of exposures in the zip code, given the prior expectation
that the variance of the random error in average realized claim cosls
is inversely related to this weight.-^ The key result is that loss ratios
are not significantly and negatively related to PCTBLACK in any line.
The estimated coefficient is positive for hoth collision and comprehensive coverage. These results are therefore inconsistent with the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, blacks are charged higher prices relative to
claim costs than whites.
The positive coefficient on PCTBLACK is statistically significant for
collision coverage. Reverse discrimination is an unlikely explanation of
this result. Other possible explanations include random variation in
23. SimiJar results were obtained using ordinarj/ least squares with White standard errors.

497

Race. Redtinmg

TABLE 4

INTERCEPT
PCTBLACK
log TOTPOP
PCri824
PCT55UP
MARRIED
PCTUNEMP
log AVGCARV

VVeietilcd Lea.'^1 Squares Regre.ssion Results for
Ihe Lo^ of the V'uluntan' Markei Loss Ratio
(LOSSKAT)
Collision

Comprehensive

Liability

-.71
(-3.53)
.09
(1.96)
-.02
(3.25)
.23
(1.83)
-.05
(.65)
.32
(5.47)
.86
(2.77)
-.17
(23)

1.98
(2.73)
.11
(.63)
-.10
(4.43)
-.23
(.50)
-.47
(1.76)
-.19
(.90)
.11
(.10)
-.87
(3.26)

-.91
(7.24)
-.01
(.21)
.03
(2.47)
38
(1.91)
-.06
(.55)
.39
(4.21)
.58
(1.21)

MEDLIMITS
H1GHLIMITS
OLS adjusted « '

.46
(2.80)
-.06
(.74)

...
.17

.11

.06

NOTE.—Obseniiiionsure for270 Miwiouri /ipcodes in im'lropuliiun stuiisiical areas using ajitia-ttalc insurance markei iJ;ila fnini 19JiK ihroii^h 1992;
wcighi IS Ihc number of exposures: aKlTicients on portent variables arc niuliiplied by iOl); absolute / stalisiics are in parcnlheses bclnw cocnificni t."Miniaies.
PCTBLACK is ihc proponion of ihc [xipubiion ihal is blatk. lug TOTPOP is
Ihe natural logarithm of total pttpulalion. PCTI824 i& tht: peaentiige of the
adult population between the ages of IH and 24, PCT55UP is the percentage
of the adult population ttiat is .S5 years or older. MARRIFf> is the percentage
of households »iih a tnarTicd couple. P d T ' N E M P IN ihc percentage of the
population ihal is unemployed, log AVCrCARV [•, the lop ot incragc insured
car value billed on classiJications reported in the appendix. MUIJIJMITS is the
percentage of liability policies with medium limits (exposure cltiss 2 in llie uppen(lix). and HIGHI.IMfr.S Is the |)erct.-ntuge ofliability policies with high liinits
(exposure classes 3. 4. und .S in the appendix;. OLS = ordinal^ least squares.

claim costs and varialioti in the demand for quality that is not captured
by the control variables.•"• if. on average, demand for quality is lower
in /.ip codes with a higher proportion of minorities, then loss ratios will
tend to be higher in these areas. This type of quality variation does not
imply discrimination, however, as premiums vary with quality.
The explanatory power of the loss ratio equations is relatively low,
which may reflect the ambiguous effects of the control variables on
loss ratios in addition to sizable random variation in claim costs at
the zip-ctxle level. Several of the variables have statistically significant
24. Also nole thai the probability thai random variation would lead to rejection of the
null bypotlnrsis of a zero coefficient in at lea.st one of three lines uf business is higher (hun
if only one line were being examined.

••SS

Journal of Business

coefficients, suggesting that transaction/capital costs vary with these
variables." The coefficient on MARRIED is positive and significant
for both collision and liability coverage, which is consistent with lower
average transactions costs in areas with more married couples due to
larger renewal rates (persistency), a greater prevalence of multiple car
policies, and/or becau.se tnarried couples are tnore likely to purchase
other types of insurance (life and homeowners) with the same insurer.
The positive relation between loss ratios and PCTUNEMP could refiect
lower demand for quality in economically depressed regions (or unexpectedly high collision losses in these regions during this period).-''
Table 5 provides evidence of the robustness of the results for
PCTBLACK for five specifications of the loss ratio trtodel that exclude
one or more of the detnographic variables and for two specifications
that include other demographic variables measuring econotnic conditions (LMEDHINC and PCTPOOR) and education (PCTHIGHS). We
also show results obtained when fixed county effects are included in
each specification. For collision and comprehensive coverage, only one
coefficient for PCTBLACK is negative, and this estimate has a /-ratio
near zero. For liability coverage, several of the coefficients without
fixed effects and all of the estimates with fixed effects are negative.
The negative estimates are significantly different from zero at the .05
level for a one-tailed test for three specifications without fixed effects
and for one specification with fixed effects. Each of ihese specifications
excludes MARRIED. There are good conceptual reasons for including
MARRIED, as it may be a proxy for transactions costs and persistency.
The variable MARRIED is often significantly related to the loss ratio
(and average claim cosls. see below) for all of the coverages, suggesting
that the preferred specifications include this variable. Thus, the overall
results of our analysis of voluntary market loss ratios provide little or
no evidence that racial discritnination gives rise to higher pretniums
relative to claim costs in minority areas.-'
25. The signs arc not always consistent across lines, which might refiect random variatioti in claim costs across lines.
26. It might be argticd ihai ioss ratios should be higher in densely populated urban areas
with high expected claim costs based on the presumption that underwriting and distributions costs increase less th;in proptirtionate!y wilh expected claim costs. While the cocfticienl un log TOTPOP is positive and significant fur iiiibility coverage, the negative ;ind
significant coefficients on this variable for ctillision and coiiiprL'hcnsive coverage are inconsistent with this hyptrthcsi.s. The latter ri;sult.s might indicttte higher underwriting and distribution costs or lower renewal rates in more densely populated areas. Recall also that al!
of our /.ip codes are in urban areas.
27. In order to allow for the possibility that loss ratios could be related to expected
claim costs (see n. 12 above), we also estimated loss ratio mixJels that included the log
of average claim costs. Given the random error (measurement emir) in average claim costs
relative to expected claim costs, we employed instrumental variables estimation (compare
Harrington 1987), using the log of the average premium by zip code as an insuiiment for
the log of average claim costs. TTie coefficient on the log of average claim costs was not
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Altemative Specifications oT Loss Ratio Modei
Collision

Comprehensive

Liability

Specification

(!)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

With fixed county effects
Model shown in table 4

no

yes

no

.09

.07

(1.96)
.06

(L51)
.09

.11
(.64)
.18

yes
.42
(3.24)
.22

no
-.01
(.21)
-.10

yes
-.08
(1.03)
-.i2

(2.09)

(2.98)
.18

(1.83)
.12

(2.01)

.16

(4.68)
-.03
(.07)

(5.01)

(L76)
-.08
(LI2)
-.13
(1.64)
-.07

.01

(1.05)
-.08

(.15)

(1.11)

.03

-.03
(.30)
-.03
(.67)

Without MARRIED, PCTUNEMP. PCTI824. iind
KT55UP
Withoui PCTUNEMP.
PCT1824, and PCr55UP
Withoui MARRIED
Without PCTUNEMP

.18

(5.05)
Without PCTUNEMP; with
PCTPOOR and LOG MEDHINC
Wilh PCTPOOR. LOG MEDHINC. iind PCTHIGHS
Wilh PCTBLACK only

.15

(3.57)
.12
(2.62)
.04
(1.53)

(.19)
.18

(1.01)
.16
(1.05)
.12

(5.t)2)
.14

(.94)
.19

(2.92)
.28
(3.08)
.39
(3.16)
.28
(3.00)
.45

(3.15)

(1.24)
.03
(.20)
.13
(1.32)

(3.96)
.49
(3.73)
.23
(3.03)

.01

.13

(2.59)
.09

(2.89)

.01

(.12)
-.12
(1.93)
.03

(.60)

(.39)
-.08
(1.89)

NorE.—Coefficients for PCTBLACK witfi absolute /-statjsties are in parentheses below frani
weighted lea.st squares estimation for 270 urban zip codes; weight is the number i>f exposures; eocfficients arc multiplied hy I(H). PCTBLACK is the pniportion of the piijiulaiuiii IhiiT is hlack. PCTI824
is the percentage of the aduK pupuliitidn hetwceti the ages of IK and 24. K'T5.'it.iP is the percciilage
of ihf aduli population thai is S.S years or older. MARRIED is the percetilage of households with a
married couple. PCTUNEMP is the fwrLcntagc of the population ihal is unemployed. MtiDHINC is
the median household ineome. PCTHIGHS is the percentage of the adult population that has hnishcd
high school, PCTPOOR is tlie perccnt;ige of households with income IK'IOW the poverty level.

As is true for the overall volutitary tnarket. discritnitiation would
imply thai nonsiandard itisurer loss ratios would be lower in zip codes
with larger minority populaliotis. A priori, estimation of separate loss
ratio tnodels for the nonstandard market is hitidered by ihe comparalively small number of exposures and correspondingly large random
variation in average claim costs. We nonetheless estimated the reduced
form models reponed in table 4 for nonstandard market policies using
the 153 zip codes with at least 5(X) nonstandard liability exposures (the
previous models required I,OCX) total exposures) and found little evidence indicating that loss ratios were negatively related to
PCTBLACK. The coefficients, with r-values in parentheses, on
PCTBLACK for collision, cotiiprehensive, and liability are .12 (.85),
.68 (2.54). and -.06 (-.46), respectively.'**
signiticant for any of the three lines, and the coefficients and (-values for PCTBLACK
changed very little from those reported in table 4.
28. Similar results to those reported in table 4 also were obtained when we estimated
the loss ratio models excluditig nonstandard policies.
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V. Are Average Claim Costs and Nonstandard Market Share Related
to Race?
An implication of our loss ratio results is that auto-insurance-affordability problems in urban areas with comparatively large minority populations are not caused by discrimination. Instead, as is suggested by
the higher average claim costs in urban zip codes with PCTBLACK
less than 20% than in zip codes with PCTBLACK greater than 20%
(see table 2). higher premiums reflect higher claim costs in these areas.
Higher average claim costs in these areas also would be expected to
be associated with higher nonstandard market share without racial discrimination. This section presents additional evidence on the relation
between average claim costs, nonstandard market share, and race.
Table 6 presents WLS results of (1) simple regressions of the log
of average claim costs on PCTBLACK for each line of coverage and
(2) reduced-form models for average claim costs that include
PCTBLACK and the control variables included in the loss ratio models.
The table also shows predicted values of average claim costs when
PCTBLACK equals 0% and 100% when all other explanatory variables
are set to their sample means.'^ Table 6 indicates a very strong univariate relationship between average claim costs and PCTBLACK for each
line of business. The coefficient on PCTBLACK declines in size in the
multivariate equations, but it remains significantly positive for each
line. This result suggests that our control variables omit one or more
factors that are related to average claim costs and that are correlated
with PCTBLACK.'" An implication is that these omitted cost factors
will also be likely to produce a positive coefficient in reduced form
models for nonstandard market share without discrimination.
Table 7 presents the results of simple regressions of nonstandard

29. The predicted values equal exp(y)(X 100). where y is ihe predicted value of the
log of average clainn costs (with average claim costs in SlOOs). While exp(.v) generally
will not be an unbiased predictor, the bias should be small and should not affect the implications of these comparisons or similar comparisons for nonstandard market share (see
below).
30. Estimation of separate redueed-fotro models of claim frequency and severity indicated a ptisitive and significant relation between PCTBLACK and collision coverage claim
frequency, liability coverage claim frequency, and comprehensive coverage claim severity.
We also estimated the average claim cost equations in table 6 controlling for fixed county
effects. Tlie coefficient estimate on PCTBLACK continues to be positive and statistically
significant for collision and comprehensive coverage, but it is not significant for liability
coverage. We al.w estimated alternative specifications thai excluded some demographic
variables and included other variables, but PCTBLACK generally remained posilively related to average claim costs after controlling for the other variables. Among other specifications, we included an interaction variable between PCT55UP and PCTBLACK to allow
for the possibility that comparatively few elderiy blacks drive than elderly whites, thus
increasing average claim costs in zip codes with greater values of PCTBLACK for any
given value of PCT55UP. High correlations between the interaction variable and its components led to large standard errors for the coefficients for each variable.
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Weighted Least Squares Regression Results for the Logarithm of
Average Claim Costs in $100s (AVGCC)
Collision

INTERCEPT
PCTBLACK

Comprehensive

Liability

0)

(2)

(3)

14)

(5)

(6)

.060
(6.81)
.50
(11.59)

-2.30
(8.76)
.22
(3.68)
-.01
(1.46)
-.64
(3.91)
-.40
(4.21)
-.18
(2.34)
2.34
(5.79)
1.08
(H.U)

-.81
(37.21)
.75
(6.98)

.29
(.39)
.30
(1.75)
-.13
(5.50)
-1.19
(2.51)
-.73
(2.63)
-.83
(3.77)
1.97
(1.69)
.05
(.19)

.39
(31.36)
.34
(5.86)

.10
(.63)
.26
(3.06)
.05
(3.74)
-.76
(2.97)
-.52
(3.46)
-.23
(1.89)
1.37
(2.24)

log TOTPOP
PCn824
PCT55UP
MARRIED
PCTUNEMP
log AVGCARV
MEDLIMITS

.85
(4.05)
.53
(5.16)

HIGHLIMITS
OLS adjusted R'
Predicted AVGCC:
PCTBLACK - 0 ($)
Predicted AVGCC;
PCTBLACK = 100
($)

.33

.56

.17

.28

.14

.37

106

109

51

53

135

136

175

136

107

71

190

177

Noit.—Ob.scrvations arc for 270 Missouri urban /ip ctxfes using aggregate insurance miirkci data
from 1988 through 19^2: weighi i.s ilii: number of exposures; coeftiticni.s with absolute r-siatistics
arc in parentheses below; coeflicients on percent variables are multiplied by 100. PCrBLACK is ihe
percentage of tlic population thai is black, log TOTPOP is [he natural logarithm of loial population.
PCTI824 i.s the percentage of the adult population between the ages of 18 and 24. PCT.^5UP i.s the
percentage of the aduli pfjpulation that is $5 years or older. M ARRtED is ihe percentage of hou.sehold.>i
with a married couple, PCTUNEMP is ihe percentage of the population ihat is unemployed, log AVGCARV is the log ol' average insured car value based on cla.ssifications reported in the appendix, MEDUMITS is the percentage of liability policies with medium limits (exposure class 2 in Ihe appendix).
and H1GHI.IMIT.S is the percentage of liability policies with high limits (exposure classes 3. 4. and
5 in the appendix). Predicted AVGCC is the predicted value of avenige claim cosis for the specified
value uf PCTBLACK with other variahles equal to ihe sample means. OLS = ordinary least squares.

market share (in log odds form) on PCTBLACK and reduced-form
regressions that include the control variables using least squares with
White's heleroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.^' Because drivers
will usually purchase each coverage from one insurer (and are required
to purchase liability coverage), we report results for a model that includes MEDLIMITS and HIGHLIMITS (defined for the entire volun31. The disturbance variance in the non.staiidard share model should decline wiili bolh
ihe nutnber of nonstandard exposures and the lotal numtier of exposures.
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TABLE 7

Ordinary lAiast Squares Regres.sion Results for the Nonstandard
Market Share <in Lug Odds Form)
Collision

INTERCEPT
PCTBLACK

(1)

(2)

(3)

-4.28
(145.40)
2.15
(17.00)

-2.89
(8.32)
.94
(5.78)
.02
(L2I)
.34
(.38)
-1.65
(4.14)
-1.20
(5.81)
2.30
(2.20)
.87
(2.05)
-1.27
(5.89)

-4.34
(148.72)
2.15
(17.15)

log TOTPOP
PCT1824
PCT55UP
MARRIED
PCTUNEMP
MEDLIMITS
HIGHLIMITS
OLS adjusted RPredicted NSSHARE:
PCTBLACK = 0 (%)
Predicted NSSHARE:
PCTBLACK = 100 (%)

Comprehensive

.52
L4
10.6

.72
1.5
3.7

.52
1.3
lO.I

(4)

Liability
(5)

-2.99
-3.43
(8.40) (114.97)
.98
1.72
(6.13)
(L142)
.03
(1.40)
.48
(.53)
-1.63
(4.07)
-1.14
(5.56)
2.19
(2.13)
.78
(1-82)
-1.24
(5.73)
.72
1.4
3.8

.40
3.1
15.3

(6)
-1.74
(4.86)
.30
(1.82)
.02
(1.18)
.24
(.32)
-1.62
(4.39)
-L18
(5.17)
3.37
(3.72)
.11
(.27)
-L65
(8.32)
.72
3.6
4.7

NOTE.—Observations arc for 270 Missouri urban zip codes using aggregate insurance market data
from 1988 through 1992; coefrtcients with absolute / staiisiigs using White sianilard emirs are in parentheses below: coefficients on percent variables are multiplied by 100. PCTBLACK is ihe percentage
of the populatinii Uiai is hiack. log TOTPOP is the natural logarithm of total population. PCTIH24 is
Ihc percentage of the adull population between the ages of 18 and 24. PCT55UP is the percentage of
the adull population that is 53 years or older. MARRIED is the percentage tif households wiih a married
couple, PCTUNEMP is the percentiigo of the population that is unemployed, MEDLIMITS is the
percentage of liability policies with medium limiLs (exposure class 2 in the appendix), and HIGHLIMITS is the percentage of liabihty policies with high limits (exposure classes 3. 4. and 5 in the
appendix). Predicted NSSHARE is the predicted value of nonstandard share for the specified value
of PCTBLACK with other variables equal to the sample means. OLS = ordinary least squares.

tary market) in each multivariate regression, as opposed to including
the log of average car value in the collision and comprehensive equations (or including both types of variables in each equation). Table 7
also shows the predicted nonstandard market shares for PCTBLACK
equal to 0% and 100% when the other explanatory variables are set to
their sample means.^As expected given the univariate comparisons in table 2. the simple
32. The predicted percentages eqtial 100|:/( 1 + :.)\. where z. is the predicted (unlogged)
odds ratio. As an alternative, we approximated tjnbia.sed predictors of the tidds ratio assutning nomially disirihuied disturbatices and using exp(H + .5o-) where u is the predicted
log odds ratio and o ' is residual variance. The variance adjustment had little etiecl on the
predicted percentages.
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regressions indicate a strotig positive relation betweeti nonstandard
market share and PCTBLACK. As predicted given the evidence in table
6 that PCTBLACK is positively correlated with omitted factors that
increase claim costs, the reduced forms also indicate a positive and
significant relation between PCTBLACK and nonslandard market
share for each line of business, although the magnitude of the predicted
relation is much smaller when the control variables are included. While
the nonstandard market share analysis by itself cannot distinguish the
omitted-variable explanation of this positive relation from a discrimination explanation, our loss ratio and average claim cost results clearly
favor the omitted-variable explanation. Consistent with older, married,
and wealthier individuals having lower expected claim costs (and perhaps greater persistency), nonstandard market share is negatively related to PCT55UP. MARRIED, and HIGHLIMITS. Results for a variety of other specifications had similiar implications for PCTBLACK
(including models that omitted PCTUNEMP and included PCTPOOR,
MEDHINC. PCTHIGHS. and fixed county effects).
We also used instrutnental variables estimation to estimate nonstandard share models thai included the predicted log of average claim costs
from a regression of the log of average claim costs on the log of average
premiums, given the random variation (measurement error) in average
claim costs compared with expected claim costs (also see n. 27). Because the average level of expected claim costs for drivers in a zip
code should be related to omitted cost factors, including this variable
as a regressor n;ught reduce omitted-variable bias. However, a positive
relation between nonstandard share and PCTBLACK is still predicted
to the extent that, for a given mean of expected claim costs.
PCTBLACK is positively correlated with the proportion of drivers with
high enough expected claim costs to make coverage in the nonstandard
market likely (or a negative correlation with factors related lo persistency). The coefticient on the average claim-cost variable was positive
and highly significant for each line, and the coefficient for PCTBLACK
declined in size compared wiLh table 7 (and was not significant for
liability coverage). Given the results of our loss ratio and average
claim-cost equations, this finding suggests that PCTBLACK is correlated with omirted cost factors related to the proportion of high-risk
drivers and/or omitted economic factors that could affect renewal rates,
nonpayment of premiums, and so on.'^
33. To explore whether crime rates mighl be importanl omitted variables in the average
claim cost and nonstandard share equiilions. we obtained 1993 crime rales (offenses per
thousand people) for a variety of violent crimes and motor vehicle theft for nine St. Louis
and four Kansas City police districts. By overlaying police-district maps and zip-codes
maps, we estimated crime rates for 47 zip ccxles in St. Louis acid Kansas Cily. We then
recstimaied the average claim cost, nonstandard share, and, for completeness, loss ratio
equations using just these 47 zip codes. While PCTBLACK and the estimated crime rates
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Summary and Conclusion

Following Becker's (1993) suggestion to analyze profitability to test
for discrimination, we exatnine whether automobile-in.surance market
loss ratios are related to percent minority population. Compared with
tests for discrimination in lending market.s that use rejection rates or
default rates, our analysis of loss ratios is much less susceptible to bias
from omitted variables that could be positively correlated with both the
risk of loss and percent minority population. Controlling for available
demographic and coverage related factors that could influence autoinsurattce loss ratios, our main finding is that loss ratios are not negatively related to percent minority population. This result is inconsistent
with the hypothesis that racial discrimination increases premiums relative to expected claim costs for minorities. Absent significantly lower
transaction costs or reductions in quality for minorities that would materially increase insurer profits for any given level of the loss ratio, this
finding implies that insurer profits are not higher for minorities.
Our loss ratio results suggest that auto-insurance-affordability problems in urban areas with large minority populations reflect higher costs
of providing coverage rather than discrimination. Indeed, univariate
comparisons with the Missouri data indicate a strong positive relation
between average claim costs and percent minority population. In addition, our regression equations for average claim costs that include a
variety of control variables generally indicate a significant positive relationship between average claim costs and percent minority population.
which is consistent with omitted cost factors that are positively related
to percent minority population. As predicted given this result, we also
find that nonstandard market share is positively and significantly related
to percent minority population after controlling for our demographic
and coverage variables. When viewed in isolation (and as is also true
for studies of mortgage lending that focus on rejection rates), our nonstandard market share results cannot distinguish whether this positive
relation is due to discrimination or omitted cost factors. However, the
combination of our loss ratio results, which iu-e inconsistent with discriminatioti, and our average claim-cost results, which are consistent
with omitted cost factors correlated with percent minority population.
provide strong support lor the omitted-variable explanation.
It would be desirable to have further research on omitted cost factors
that could be correlated with claim costs and percent minority population, as well as research on whether quality differs materially between
hlacks and whites, after controlling for other factors that affect the demand for quality, and. if so, whether reduced quality for minorities
increases insurer profits. These types of research will be difficult with
generally were posilively correlated, the inclusion of the crime-rate variables did nol alter
the main conclusions.
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existing data. Because of unavailability of data, we could not control
for possible differences in crime or theft rates in large numbers of zip
codes, for possible differences by race in the age and sex distribution
of drivers, or for differences in transactions costs that could be related
to product quality. In principle, it might be desirable to measure some
of the demographic variables for the driving population, as opposed to
the total population, or possibly to use data at the individual policyholder level rather than aggregate data at the zip-code level. However,
requiring insurers or government agencies to develop these types of
data would be costly, and it would still be necessary to use population
measures for a number of environmental factors.

Appendix
Additional Data Description
Insurance Market Data
The five policy (insurer) types for which data are reported lo the Missouri Department of Insurance are defined by the Missouri Depanment as follows:
A. Preferred family.—A policy form al least equal to family automobile insurance ordinarily offered to risks meeting high acceptance standards at rates
less than the industry average.
B. Standard family.—A policy form at least equal to family automobile insurance ordinarily offered lo risks categorized as better than average at rates
at or near the industry average.
C. Standard risk.—A policy form of the basic automobile type ordinarily offered to risks evaluated as average or slightly below average at rates at or
slightly above the industry average.
D. Nonstandard basic—A policy fonn of the basic automobile type ordinarily
offered to risks evaluated as poor or below average at rates considerably
greater than the industry average.
E. The JUA Basic.—A policy written under the Joint Underwriting Association.
The category definitions imply that rates increase and underwriting standards
decline as one moves from category A to category D. Conversations with the
Missouri Department of Insurance indicated that coverage terms were similar
across these categories and ihat differences among the categories primarily reflect
differences in rates and underwriting standards across insurers. The bulk of reported exposures (90%-95%) for the voluntary market are in categories A and
B with relatively few exposures in category C.
The exposure class deHnitions are shown in table Al. We define average car
value as the weighted average (using the percentage of policies in each exposure
class as weights) of the midpoints of the auto-value intervals for each class.
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TABLE AI

Class

TABLE A2

Exposure Class Dennitions
Liability Limits ($)

Collision and
Comprehensive
Car Value ($)

Split

0-3.700
3.701-8.(XX)
8.001-17.500
I7..5O1-24.(.H)O
24.001 and ahove

25.0(X)/50.(H)0
50.000/100.000
1OO.(KK)/3(X),(XK1
250.0{X)/500,(XX)
500.{K)()/1.(XX).0(X)

Single

500.(X)0-I.O(X).000
I .{XX).O(X) and above

Corretation Cuefiicients for Primary Demographic and Insuranee
Coverage Variables
PCT.
log
BLACK TOTPOP PCTI824 PCT55UP MARRIED

liig TOTPOP
PCT1824
PCT55UP
MARRIED
PCTL'NEMP
log AVtiCARV
MEDLIMITS
HICHLIMITS

6O.(XX)-100.000
100.(XX)-300.000

,29
.21
.07
-,70
.72
-.26
-.10
-.20

.28
-.09
-.39
.12
.21
.02
.17

-.33
-.38
,24
-,10
,03
-.14

-.10
.15
-.09
-.13
-.08

-..15
.15
.16
.2!

perUNEMP

log
AVGCAR

-.46
.06
-.49

-.10
.98

MED-

-,25

Control Variables and I.,oss Ratios
Definitions and descriptive statistics for our demographic and coverage variables
are shown in tables I and 3. respectively. Table A2 shows the correlation matrix
for ihe primary control variables used in the analysis.
As noted in the text. X, (the present value of insurers' costs per dollar of expected claim costs) will depend on (1) the timing of claim payments. (2) the riskadjusted discount rate, (3) the amount of capital held by insurers, and (4) the
expense loading lor insurer underwriting, distribution, claim settlement, and policy service costs. The speed with which claims are paid and the amount of insurer
capital are dimensions of product quality, the demand for which is likely to vary
with income or wealth.'"' Other quality characteristics that could increase insurer
operating expenses also should depend on differences in demand. Insurer underwriting expense ratios (total underwriting and distribution expenses as a proportion of premiums) and thus loss ratios vary with insurer distribution systems, with
direct writers generally having lower expense ratios and higher loss ratios than
insurers that use independent agents." Direct writers also are known on average
34. Unobserved differences in property damage versus bodily injury liability mix could
be related to Income or wealth, although the effect is iheoretically uncertain. Ctaim-settlemeni expenses will be lower bui claims will tend lo be paid Tasier in zip codes with higher
proportions of properly damage liability claims. The effect of this mix on X, is thus ambiguous.
35. Whether this difference reflects a difference in service quality has been disputed
(e.g.. Cummins. Weiss, and Berger 1997).
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for insuring drivers with lower expected claim costs than auto insurers that use
independent agents, and direct writers tend to focus on business with high persistency. Insurers with customer bases with higher pohcyholdcr persistency (renewal
rates) will tend to have lower expense loadings because front-end expenses can
be amortized over a longer period. Persistency could depend on demographic
characteristics, such as population mobility and income. Expense ratios and thus
loss ratios also could depend on economies related to multiple-car discounts and
possible economies of scope from cross-selling between the marketing of auto
insurance and other types of insurance to a given household.
It is possible that expense loadings and loss ratios also might be related to
expected claim costs. For example (and as noted in n. 12). if some underwriting
expenses do not increase in direct proportion to expected claim costs (e.g.. fixed
costs of processing an application), loss ratios could be related positively to factors that increase expected claim costs. Thus, any underwriting expenses that are
less than proportional lo expected claim costs could cause loss ratios to be higher,
for example, for young drivers and in large urban areas with higher expected claim
costs. However, truly fixed costs are likely to be small, and it is arguable whether
transaction costs within a state would be expected to increase less
than proportionately in these cases. For example, it is possible that required
compensation for agents and rental costs of facilities could increase proportionately (or even more than proportionately) with expected claim costs in urban
areas or that risk selection costs could be proportionately higher lor young
drivers.
With respect to our specific control variables, increased product quality, which
should reduce the loss ratio, will likely be positively related to income, wealth,
and coverage levels. The market share of direct writers, which also should be
positively related to the loss ratio due to lower expense ratios, will likely be
positively related to income, wealth, coverage levels, and perhaps PCT55UP and
MARRIED, and possibly negatively related to PCTI824. given that direct-writer
marketing strategies often emphasize business with greater persistency and opportunities for cross-selling other coverages. The effects of education could be similar to those of increased income hecause education could be correlated with unmeasured differences in income and wealth. We have no prior expectations
concerning the effects of age distribution and marital status on the demand for
product quality, other factors held constant, or concerning the possible effects of
population density, Increases in population density could tend to increase the loss
ratio if expected claim costs increase with density and transaction costs increase
less than proportionately.
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